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WHEN THE INTERNET BECOMES
X-RATED: CREATING AN ETHICAL
CLIMATE EOR TECHNOLOGY IN
CATHOLIC SCHOOLS
SUSAN HANLEY KOSSE
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law
Pornography is the number-one business on the Interne!, yet the very .same
Internet can be a valuable source of knowledge for alt students. Educational
leaders face many challenges in bringing the Internet into classrooms. This
article reviews recent and relevant case law on Internet access in schools,
offers guidance about the writing of effective acceptable use policies, and
concludes with advice to Catholic school teachers and administrators on
creating an ethical climate white fully using available technology.
AS of 1999. the Internet was made up of more than 200 million usersworldwide. There are now more than 100 countries linked to the
Internet. The Internet works by connecting computers together by various
means so instantaneous communication can occur. The World Wide Web is "a
system of Internet servers that support specially formatted documents" writ-
ten in a language called Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) (Webopedia,
2001). Web browsers such as Netscape Navigator and Microsoft's Internet
Explorer allow us to access the World Wide Web. The Internet has often been
compared to a multilane highway with the World Wide Web comprising just
one of those lanes. This technology allows people next door and around the
world to share information via video, sounds, and pictures, which has a pro-
found impact on our daily living. We now get our news from it, shop and do
business by it, and stay in touch with friends through e-mail.
It is difficult to imagine anything that has changed students' access to
information more than the Internet and the World Wide Web. With just a few
keystrokes and a click of the mouse, students can find information on virtu-
ally any subject. This technology has enabled our students to have worldwide
connections to other schools and cultures, specialized instruction, technolog-
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ical proficiency, and exposure to new topics and knowledge that the student
may not have had an opportunity to learn (Pool, Blanchard, & Hale, 1995).
Students are able to retrieve more information at greater speeds than by tra-
ditional methods of learning. "Book learning" is enhanced instantaneously
with websites that provide pictures, information, and interactive exercises.
Realizing the benefits of this technology, communities have placed a high
priority on getting their students and schools connected. In 1994, the White
House's National Information Infrastructure initiative challenged the nation's
schools to be 100% connected by the year 2000 (National Center For
Education Statistics, 2000b). By 1999 it was estimated that 95% of the pub-
lic schools had Internet access. Private schools, in contrast, are less likely to
have Internet access (National Center For Education Statistics, 2000a). In
fact, in 1998, 33% of private schools were still not connected. In general.
Catholic schools (83%) are more likely than nonsectarian schools (66%) or
those with other religious affiliations (54%) to have access. It is also inter-
esting to note that of the schools still without access. Catholic schools are
most likely to have plans to connect to the Internet in the future (74%) com-
pared to nonsectarian schools (38%) or other religious schools (41%).
Yet for all the benefits the Internet provides to school children, it has the
potential to expose them to sexually explicit material. Unfortunately, sexual-
ly explicit or pornographic sites are on the World Wide Web in greater and
greater numbers (Miller, 1999). Although it would be nearly impossible to
specify the number of such sites, there is evidence that they are increasing.
According to a recent law review article, in 1997 there were 10,000 sites con-
taining sexually explicit material on the Internet. By 1999 this number had
grown to between 30,000 and 60,000 sites. Since these sites are very prof-
itable and the fastest growing, there is no reason to think the upward trend
will end soon.
The issue for many concerned parents is how to keep our children from
accessing these inappropriate sites. Unfortunately, many of them can be
found inadvertently through what would seem harmless searches. Eor exam-
ple, a child who typed in "Sleeping Beauty," "Little Women," or "Girls.com"
may retrieve some appropriate material but also sexually explicit material
(Miller, 1999). The author indicates that Girls.com "features '125,000 hard-
core pics' and Pam Anderson [and] Tommy Lee uncensored videos"' (p. 161).
Typing WhiteHouse.com instead of WhiteHouse.gov would lead children to
a site containing pornographic material and claiming to be the number-one
adult website.
With this in mind. Congress has attempted for the last few years to pass
legislation that will protect our children from inappropriate and harmful
material found on the Internet. Although that goal is commendable, it has
proven difficult to achieve without violating the First Amendment. This arti-
cle will first examine the recent federal legislation including the lawsuits
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those laws spawned. Next, the article will discuss alternatives to legislation,
in particular, acceptable use policies. Finally, the article will conclude with
concerns specific to Catholic schools.
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
Passed as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Communications
Decency Act (CDA) prohibited Internet users from using the Internet to com-
municate material that is obscene or indecent to minors under the age of 18.
Specifically, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 223(a) provided:
Whoever—
(1) in interstate or foreign communications—
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly—
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion,
proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or
indecent, knowing that Ihe recipient of the communication is
under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication....
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to
be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that
it be used for such activity, shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned
not more than two years or both.
The second provision, section 223(d), prohibited the sending or display-
ing of messages that would be deemed, under contemporary community stan-
dards, patently offensive to a person under 18 years of age. It provided:
Whoever—
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly—
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send a specific person or per-
sons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner avail-
able to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, sug-
gestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by con-
temporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call
or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the
intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fmed under Title 18, or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
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These two provisions were limited by two affirmative defenses. One pro-
tected individuals from liability if the person had taken "in good faith, rea-
sonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances" to keep
minors from the harmful material (section 223(e)(5)(A)). The other covered
individuals who restrict access by requiring certain forms of age proof such
as a verified credit card or an adult identification number.
Despite these limiting defenses, the statute was struck down by the
Supreme Court in Reno u ACLU i\991) on the grounds that it was unconsti-
tutionally vague and too broad, violating the First Amendment. The Court
used a strict scrutiny standard which requires the government to show not
only a compelling interest for the law but also that the law is a necessary
means to achieving the goal. In striking down CDA, the Court was particu-
larly troubled over undefmed key terms such as "indecent" and "patently
offensive." The failure of Congress to define these, among other words, made
the statute unconstitutionally vague because an individual would not have a
clear understanding of what material was to be included by those terms.
Perhaps even more troubling for the Court was the statute's "wholly
unprecedented" breadth since it was "not limited to commercial speech or
commercial entities...[but rather] [i]ts opened prohibitions embrace[d] all
nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying
them on their own computers" (Reno, 1997, p. 877). Although the statute
would further the government's interest in protecting children from harmful
Internet material, the CDA would result in the suppression of legitimate
material that adults have a constitutional right to send and receive. Therefore
the court opined that the government was required to use less restrictive
means to achieve its goals of protecting minors.
Moreover the statute was void of any guidance on which community
standards in particular would be applied to determine whether material was
harmful to minors. Since the Internet is available to the world, it is conceiv-
able that a community standards criterion under this law could be interpreted
to mean the community that has the most restrictive views about what is
offensive {Reno. 1997).
Finally, the defenses provided in the statute were unworkable and did not
"constitute the 'narrow tailoring' necessary to save an unconstitutional provi-
sion" {Reno, 1997, p. 882). Although the age verification was a legitimate
option for commercial sites, the court found that it was not economically fea-
sible for noncommercial sites. In addition, the Court was skeptical whether
the curTent technology used by commercial pornographers actually kept chil-
dren from gaining access. In light of the statute's criminal sanctions, the
Court agreed with the District Court that the government had failed to prove
that the defense would reduce the heavy burden on adult speech.
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CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT
In 1998, Congress attempted to correct the problems of the Communications
Decency Act and address the concerns raised by the Supreme Court by enact-
ing the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). Specifically COPA prohibits an
individual or entity from:
Knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate
or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, mak[ing] any com-
munication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that
includes any material that is harmful to minors. (47 U.S.C. 231(a)(l))
This second attempt was noticeably narrower than CDA in three respects.
First, COPA only applied to commercial pornographers, unlike CDA, which
affected all communications. Second, COPA only applied to Web communi-
cations. Finally, the standard was changed from the ambiguous "indecent and
patently offensive" standards to a "harmful to minors" standard.
Congress also defined some of the essential key terms including "by
means of the World Wide Web," "minor," "commercial purposes," and
"engaged in the business." In addition, to give the "harmful to minors" stan-
dard criterion more clarity. Congress adopted a three-prong test, set out first
in Miller v. California (1973), which would give guidance in determining
what is actually harmful to minors. For liability to attach, it must be proven
that the material:
a) Ijudged by] the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards,...taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is
designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, prurient interest;
b) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an
actual or simulated normal or perverted act, or a lewd exhibition of the
genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
c) taken as a whole, lacks serious, literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors, (p. 24)
The day after the statute became effective, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) filed suit once again, claiming that the statute violated the
First and Fifth Amendments because it was vague and infringed upon the pro-
tected speech of adults (ACLU v. Reno, 2000). The United States District
Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing COPA's enforcement. The
government appealed to the Third Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's
order, holding that the District Court properly exercised its discretion in
granting the injunction (ACLU, 2000). Although the Court did not rule on the
statute's constitutionality per se, its opinion gives a clear indication that this
statute too would be found to be overbroad and thus unconstitutional.
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Specifically, the court concluded its opinion by stating, "Due to current tech-
nological limitations, COPA—Congress' laudatory attempt to achieve its
compelling objective of protecting minors from harmful material on the
World Wide Web̂ —is more likely than not to be found unconstitutional as
overbroad on the merits" (ACLU, 2000, p. 180).
To determine whether the preliminary injunction was properly granted,
the Third Circuit applied a four-prong test (ACLU, 2000). The four prongs
were: I) whether the movant had shown a reasonable probability of success
on the merits; 2) whether the movant will be irreparably harmed by denial of
the relief; 3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater
harm to the nonmoving party; and 4) whether granting the preliminary relief
will be in the public interest. The most important prong is whether there is a
reasonable probability that the party seeking the injunction will succeed on
the merits if the case is taken to trial. In analyzing this prong the Court rec-
ognized that the government did have a compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren from harmful material. This objective, however, must be met in the least
restrictive means available. In surmising that the statute was unconstitution-
al, the Court focused on COPA's definition of "harmful to minors," applying
a "contemporary community standards" clause. It did so while recognizing
that the District Court had identified several other grounds for declaring the
statute unconstitutional. For example, the District Court found that the eco-
nomic costs and burdens of the age verification requirement were too great of
a burden on publishers, forcing them to stop publishing or more heavily cen-
sor what they published. The Third Circuit acknowledged that this may be
true but opined that the even greater problem with the statute was that the
Supreme Court's concern regarding the "community standards" test in the
unconstitutional CDA was still not adequately remedied by this new statute
lACLU. 2000).
In response, the government argued that Congress had effectively dealt
with this issue by including the Miller (1973) three-prong test within the
statute's text. The Court, however, was not persuaded that this cured the prob-
lem since the facts in Miller differed drastically from the current situation.
Miller involved the mailing of sexually explicit material, which was in viola-
tion of California law. The publisher of the information could control to
which geographic locations the material was sent. But because the Internet
has no geographic boundaries and publishers have no means of even know-
ing what locale their material goes to, the Court reasoned that a community
standards test would be particularly troublesome and not appropriate. In
essence, the publisher would be forced to censor material that may be
accessed from extremely puritan communities or implement costly age veri-
fication systems. This would effectively block material from all minors even
if it were not deemed harmful in their own communities. In addition, adults
would be unconstitutionally deprived of their rights.
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Based on this decision, the government had three options. It could appeal
the ruling to the Supreme Court, ask for the entire United States Third Circuit
Court of Appeals to reconsider, or go back to the lower court and request a
full trial. As of the time of this writing, none of these options bad been pur-
sued, indicating the government probably surmised any challenge they made
would be unsuccessful. Because of the injunction prohibiting the statute's
enforcement, COPA is virtually useless.
BLOCKING SOFTWARE BILLS
An alternative way to limit minors' access to harmful Internet material is to
use filtering software. Filtering software falls into two general categories:
predetermined blocking filters and ratings-based filters (Semitsu, 2000). The
predetermined filters block access by one of five methods: blacklists, allow
lists, word blocking, image-blocking, and the blocking of entire categories (p.
513). Most common is the use of blacklists, which block sites that have been
predetermined to be inappropriate. Many of the programs use some form of
word blocking, which often can lead to the overinclusive blocking of consti-
tutionally protected material. Eor example, there are reports that certain pro-
grams banned the word breast, unintentionally blocking all websites dealing
with breast cancer. Critics of filtering software argue that this technology can
be underinclusive as well. A recent report testing one software blocking
product found that thousands of unbanned porn sites were not properly
blocked mainly because it was too difficult for any manufacturer to keep up
with all the new material added daily to the Internet.
More sophisticated rating-based filters (PICS) allow individuals, web-
masters, or third-party groups to rate sites by creating descriptive labels
(Semitsu, 2000). PICS can then read the labels and use their own filtering cri-
teria to decide whether to block the site. This technology makes it much eas-
ier to tailor what will and will not be blocked based on the policies and con-
cerns of the library or school using it. Ideally, each community library could
create its own criteria for blocking sites. Realistically, however, this would be
too burdensome for the libraries and they will be forced to adopt criteria
designed by third-party organizations. This, critics argue, will result in these
third-party organizations' subjective value judgments being implemented by
the libraries (Semitsu, 2000).
Despite the debate over the technology, legislation that would require
schools and libraries with Internet access to install blocking software on their
computers has been on the legislative agenda for several years. The first pro-
posed act to address the issue was the Safe Schools Internet Act of 1998.
Senator John S. McCain introduced the bill to the Senate on February 9,
1998, while Representative Bob Franks introduced H.R. 3177 two days later.
Both those acts proposed amending 47 U.S.C. 254 to require that elementary
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and secondary schools and libraries receiving federal Internet access subsi-
dies install blocking software. Specifically the act provided that "no services
may be provided...to any elementary or secondary school, or any library,
unless it provides the certification...that it has...selected a system for com-
puters with Internet access to filter or block matter deemed to be inappropri-
ate for minors" (Safe Schools, 1998).
The Senate version of the bill was referred to the Committee on
Commerce, and hearings were held. On June 25, 1998, Senator McCain
reported to the Senate and the bill was placed on the Senate Legislative
Calendar. It was attached to the FY 1999 Commerce, Justice, State
Appropriations bill on July 21, 1998, and passed by the Senate on July 23.
H.R. 3177 (Safe Schools, 1998) on the House side was referred to the House
Commerce Committee, where it was not acted upon.
Not to be discouraged, in January 1999 Senators McCain and Ernest F.
Hollings tried again. This time they introduced the Children's Internet
Protection Act (Title XVII, 1999). This bill was then reintroduced by McCain
as Amendment No. 3610 to the Labor, Health and Human Services
Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4577). This amendment was approved by a vote of
95-3 on June 29, 2000.
The House passed a similar but not identical bill on June 8, 2000. The
legislation was referred to a conference committee to reconcile the House and
Senate versions. Currently it is an amendment to the HHS Appropriations
Bill, which was passed by Congress on Friday, December 15, 2000 (Internet
Filtering Law. 2000), and was signed by President Clinton on December 21,
2000.
Fierce opposition to the bill has come from the American Library
Association (ALA) and free speech groups. The ALA's website had multiple
entries urging its members to lodge their disapproval with their elected rep-
resentatives. They advised their members that
Federal filtering mandates are not the answer to the very complex question
of objectionable Internet material because:
• Federal filtering mandates are unfunded mandates. They will require my
library to take on the onerous burden of paying to install and maintain fil-
ters or be stripped of key federal funding.
• Federal mandates trample on the decision-making responsibilities and
capabilities of my local library board. Mandates do not allow us to artic-
ulate our own community values because they force us to turn over our
community decisions to corporate entities.
• Federal filtering mandates are a one-size-fits-all, overly broad solution to
a complex and local problem. Around 95% of public libraries already have
in place a formal policy to regulate use of the Ititemet. But the Labor-
HHS-Ed amendments prescribe broad, unfunded federal government con-
trol in my library.
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• Federal mandates will have the most profound effect on those libraries that
most need E-rate discounts and other funding. Low-income, poverty-
stricken libraries will not have the resources to implement filtering and
comply with the certification requirement. (American Library
Association, 2000)
Even the New York Times (A Misguided Pornography Bill, 2000) pub-
lished an editorial urging Congress not to pass the amendment. The writer
called federally mandated filters ''absurd" and most likely "unconstitutional"
(p. 4-14). Since filtering software is often ineffective, the author urged more
closely monitoring students was a better solution.
In contrast, parent groups praised Senator McCain's relentless efforts to
protect children from the negative aspects of the Internet. The American
Family Association strongly supported the bill, stating that it would "provide
a very effective solution to the growing problem of pornography accessible
on the Internet by computers in schools and public libraries" (Senate
Approves Amendment, 2000, p. 2028).
Before the bill was even signed into law, the ACLU announced plans to
sue (Internet Filtering Law, 2000). ACLU lawyer Chris Hansen called the fil-
tering requirement "a mandated censorship system by the federal govern-
ment" (p. A4). Hansen took particular offense since even the bill's supporters
recognize that there are multiple problems with filters but argue that overall
filters are better than having nothing at all. Hansen stated that
The First Amendment doesn't have a 'good enough' requirement.... Suppose
we said it would be better than nothing for someone to go into Barnes and
Noble and burn every 10th book. That sort of casual insensitivity to censor-
ship is disturbing, (p. A4)
A lawsuit over the constitutionality of filters is nothing new. In fact, there
have already been lawsuits filed testing the First Amendment's limitations on
the use of Internet filtering in public libraries. In 1997, 10 individual plain-
tiffs, all adult patrons of their local library, brought a suit to enjoin the library
from installing filtering software on the library's computers (Mainstream
Loudoun V. Board of Trustees of Loudoun County Libraty I, 1998a). Earlier
that year the library board had voted to adopt a policy on Internet sexual
harassment. The policy required that "site-blocking software... be installed on
all [library] computers" so as to
a. block child pornography and obscene material (hard core pornography);
b. block material deemed Harmful to Juveniles under applicable Virginia
statutes and legal precedents (soft core pornography) (p. 556).
The commercial product X-Stop was chosen to limit access to sites that vio-
lated the library policy.
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The plaintiffs alleged a violation of their freedom of speech. Specifically
they argued that the policy impermissibly blocked their access to protected
speech and chilled their receipt of constitutionally protected materials. For
instance, they could no longer gain access to the Quaker Home Page, the Zero
Population Growth website, and the site for the American Association of
University Women—Maryland because they had been blocked. Moreover,
they claimed there were no clear criteria for determining which sites would
be blocked {Mainstream. 1998a).
Since the libraries at issue were determined to be limited public forums,
any content-based restriction had to be "narrowly drawn to effectuate a com-
pelling state interest" {Mainstream. 1998a, p. 795). The court held protecting
minors from harmful Internet material and avoiding a sexually hostile envi-
ronment were compelling government objectives. But because the filtering
policy was too broad (it was not limited to minors and there were not ade-
quate standards for restricting speech), it was not the least restrictive means
nor reasonably necessary to achieve the government's goals. The Court noted
that lesser restrictive options were available including library staff monitor-
ing, filters for minors only, and privacy screens {Mainstream, 1998b).
Just the threat of lawsuits has made some libraries change their plans to
install filters. For example, on August 16, 2000, the Nashua Public Library
Board of Trustees voted to reverse its decision to install Surfwatch software
on all their computers. This reversal came after local citizens opposed to the
policy contacted the People for the American Way Foundation and some New
Engiand attorneys. And when the ACLU threatened legal action, the public
libraries of Kern County, California, changed their policy of requiring filters
on their computers (Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, 2001).
Conversely, there has also been litigation for a library's failure to restrict
children's access to harmful Internet material, although the lawsuits have
been unsuccessful. It is not surprising that many libraries choose not to use
filters, considering the American Library's Association position that any
efforts to block access violate the Library Bill of Rights (American Library
Association, 1997). Perhaps the most publicized suit filed concerning this
matter was Kathleen R. v. Cit}' of Liver mo re (1998), in which a mother filed
suit hoping to force her local library to install filters. The impetus for the
legal battle came after her 12-year-old son downloaded pornographic pictures
off the library's computer. The case was dismissed in January 1999 in a one-
sentence ruling.
This issue has not been limited to public libraries. In 1998 in Palm Beach,
Florida, a mother sued the Broward County School Board for failing to install
filters on public school computers {Hoffman v. The School Board of Broward
County, Florida). The case was dismissed on January 14, 1999.
Whether a federal statute mandating filters for schools and libraries could
survive constitutional scrutiny is doubtful. Perhaps the biggest obstacle for
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such legislation is drafting it so it is not deemed a prior restraint. First, the
legislation must be narrowly tailored, including specific guidelines as to what
could be blocked. One of the major problems in the Loudoun case was the
complete lack of guidance as to the criterion used to block the sites. Lack of
guidance would surely bring cries of vagueness and overbreadth again. For
example, the "inappropriate to minors" standard may be too unclearly
defined to give a person the necessary guidance to know what to block. Also,
plaintiffs could argue that the law would also regulate speech that was con-
stitutionally protected.
At least one commentator on the use of filters by libraries and schools
proposes that a librarian's exclusion of Internet material can be constitution-
al as long as the libraries do not favor any one viewpoint over another (Nadel,
2000). The author compares the use of filters to the librarian's discretion in
purchasing books. He says the First Amendment does not prohibit librarians
from purchasing multiple books of the same title, which necessarily will limit
access to other titles due to the practicalities of library budgets. Therefore, the
same rationale should justify librarians using filters even if they will result in
denying patrons access to other constitutionally protected material.
Nadel (2000) takes issue with some of the findings in the Mainstream
Loudoun opinions. (See also written testimony of Jay A. Sekulow, Esq., who
also believes Mainstream Loudoun was incorrectly decided.) Specifically, he
disagrees with the Court's view that financial constraints do not impact
Internet access as they do with traditional book acquisitions (Nadel, 2000).
He argues that financial considerations apply equally to the Internet because
they essentially drive how many terminals and Internet accounts a library can
afford as well as the speed of access links. These all have an impact on how
many websites a patron can ultimately view. The solution, Nadel argues, is to
allow filters that will help librarians manage the Internet resource by pre-
venting the domination of terminals by patrons wanting to view pornography
or play games and thus tying up the terminals from more desirable uses such
as research.
Critics of this approach argue that sign up sheets could be an effective
remedy for the budgetary resource problem. However, Nadel (2000) argues
that this is not a favorable approach, noting that libraries do not purchase only
one copy of a popular book to lend on a first-come first-serve basis. This is
so even if purchasing multiple copies of the book will deny access by patrons
to other books because of limited purchasing resources or shelf space. Thus,
Nadel concludes that since this purchasing decision would not be considered
a prior restraint, the same logic should uphold the use of filters if they are uti-
lized to maximize the access of "preferred" categories of Internet content.
Nadet (2000) recognizes that libraries could get into constitutional trou-
ble if they do not guarantee that they are making the exclusions themselves
instead of some software producer of filters. Delegating full control to an out-
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sider is unquestionably unconstitutional. To avoid this, Nadel proposes that
libraries " I ) retain final say over selection decisions, 2) understand the crite-
ria that the filter software uses to exclude content, and 3) have the resources
to correct the viewpoint discrimination that the filters are likely to generate"
(p. 1118). These recommendations are particularly relevant in light of the
flawed quality of existing filters, which sometimes create errors. Therefore,
it is essential that librarians be able to "tweak" the filters to rectify any imper-
missible exclusions.
Not everyone, however, agrees with Nadel's (2000) comparison of filter-
ing to that of purchasing books. In fact some legal scholars think filtering
software is more like removing a book already in the library's collection
(Semitsu, 2000). Semitsu quotes attorney Jonathan Wallace, author of Sex,
Laws and. Cyberspace, who stated:
A library installing computers with full Internet access has, in effect,
acquired the entire contents of the Internet. Blocking software which screens
out sites based on their inclusion in a database of impermissible sites, or
blocks them based on the occurrence of banned words or phrases, is effec-
tively removing these resources from the library. Just as the board of educa-
tion did in Pico [the Supreme Court case which held that local school boards
could not remove books simply based on a dislike of a book's ideas], some-
one has gone through a thought process which resulted in the removal of
materials based on their disfavored content, (p. 527)
The ultimate resolution of whether any mandate requiring filters is con-
stitutional or not may very well turn on this distinction between removing or
selecting information for a library. As noted above, courts are much more
reluctant to uphold a library's actions of removing books. Equally as impor-
tant will be the court's designation of the library as either a limited public
forum or a nonpublic forum. If a court were to hold that Mainstream Loudoun
incorrectly classified the library as a limited public forum, the library must
only show that its content-based restrictions are reasonable and viewpoint
neutral. This would be a much easier burden than having to show that the
restriction has been narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.
ACCEPTABLE USE POLICIES
One way for schools to avoid lawsuits is to adopt and enforce acceptable use
policies (AUP). An AUP is "a written agreement signed by students, their par-
ents, and their teachers, outlining the terms and conditions of Internet use for
the safety and educational benefit of the students" (Horizon, 2001). These
agreements not only deal with the issues of pornography and obscenity but
also such matters as copyright and intellectual property laws, defamation, and
commercial use of the school-provided Internet access.
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When designing AUPs, schools should remember that the AUP is a legal
document and should be reviewed by an attorney. An AUP should contain:
" An overview of what the Internet is, how it will be û ied in the school, and why
access to it is beneficial to the educational process
• Usage policies and guidelines including what constitutes acceptable and unac-
ceptable uses of the Internet
• Penalties for violating the policies and guidelines
• A description of the rights of individuals using the networks in the school/dis-
trict
• A disclaimer absolving the school district, under specific circumstances, from
responsibility
• A clear indication that Internet access is a privilege, not a right, and may be
withdrawn. (Horizon. 2001)
There are many Web resources that can aid a school or district in drafting an
AUP. Two are: www.netizen.uoregon.edu and www.gsn,org/web/tutorial/
issues/aupsampl.htm#begin/. Taking advantage of the various templates and
suggestions listed on the Web is most helpful; however, they should not be
adopted without tailoring them to the needs and philosophies of each indi-
vidual school or district.
Although designing an AUP would appear to be fairly easy and straight-
forward, there are many issues districts or schools should consider before
drafting an AUP. If these concerns are ignored, the AUP may be challenged
in court much like the federal statutes discussed previously. Perhaps the
biggest challenge could be based on vagueness. In other words, does the AUP
clearly inform students about what is appropriate and inappropriate behavior
that could possibly lead to discipline? If a court determines it does not, the
AUP could be ruled unconstitutional.
Many common phrases found in AUPs regarding inappropriate actions
may in fact be vague and subject to court challenges. For example, phrases
such as "Students shall not access any objectionable material or inappropri-
ate material" or "Students shall not post defamatory, inaccurate, abusive,
obscene, profane, sexually oriented, threatening, offensive, or illegal materi-
al" do not clearly indicate to students what they can and cannot access or post
(Willard, 1997). In addition, these phrases are too broad. Their current word-
ing impermissibly prohibits some speech that is considered protected speech.
This unclear speech very likely has First Amendment ramifications if courts
find it chills students' free speech since they will not fully understand what
they can and cannot do (Willard, 1997).
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CATHOLIC SCHOOLS' CONCERNS
Catholic schools are governed by different rules than public schools or inde-
pendent schools. Public schools are considered to be governmental agencies
and therefore must comply with constitutional requirements. In contrast, a
Catholic school is a private agency and therefore does not have to enforce
constitutional protections {Shaughnessy, 1995). The Constitution was
designed to be a guarantee by the government that it will respect certain
rights contained within it. Since Catholic schools are not part of the govern-
ment, they make no guarantee concerning these constitutional rights.
This does not intend to imply that Catholic school students or their par-
ents have no rights {Shaughnessy, 1991). Although they have no rights under
the Constitution because a Catholic school is not a governmental agency, they
do have rights grounded in both state and federal statutory and common law.
For example, both state and federal statutes prohibit racial discrimination.
This law is not enacted by the Constitution and therefore can bind both gov-
ernmental and private agencies including Catholic schools. In addition, par-
ents and children of Catholic schools may have certain rights originating
from contract law. The terms of the contract between the Catholic schools and
its pupils are often contained in a printed handbook.
If the state is significantly involved in the private school or the contested
activity, courts will find state action and as a result constitutional rights to
exist (Shaughnessy, 1991). Courts have identified four sources for state
action in a private school: state funding, state control, tax-exempt status, and
the public benefit or function theory. A review of the case law indicates that
the definition of substantial presence of state action is somewhat difficult to
defme (Bright v. Isenbarger, 1970; Geraci v. St. Xavier High School, 1978;
Wisch V. Sanford School Inc.. 1976). From these three cases it would appear
that the court finds it very important whether the state is involved in the chal-
lenged action. In fact it must be "so entwined with the contested activity that
a symbiotic relationship could be held to exist between the state and the
action" (Shaughnessy, 1991, p. 9). This is so even where the school obtains
90% of its funds from the state (Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 1982).
If a federal law makes filters mandatory in the Catholic schools, the con-
tested activity (denial of Internet access) may be intertwined with the state
action especially if the state action is based on funding for the computers.
Although generally Catholic students would not have a cause of action
against their school or school boards based on denial of free speech, they may
in fact bring such an action if they are able to establish substantial state
actioti.
Perhaps the better option for the Catholic student is to bring an action
against the federal agency directly. This avoids the state action dilemma alto-
gether since the suit would be brought against the government itself.
528 Culluilk EduccilionAme 2001
Therefore, if a federal law mandates filters on Catholie school computers, the
student may have a valid First Amendment claim against the government.
The drafting of AUPs may be an area in which the Catholic schools will
have more latitude than their public school counterparts. It would no doubt be
unconstitutional for a public school to prohibit material because officials dis-
agreed with its viewpoint. However, if this same material was in conflict with
the Church's teachings (i.e., abortion or homosexual activity). Catholic
schools would be free to prohibit access to it.
CONCLUSION
In this unsettled area of law the goal of keeping children protected from inde-
cent and sexually explicit material on the Internet is shared by virtually all
those concerned. How to achieve that universal goal is subject to intense
debate. Legislation to this point has failed based on "vagueness" and "over-
breadth" challenges. Courts have agreed that the laws violated the First
Amendment since they chilled protected speech.
Perhaps the only way to protect students is to require them to sign and
abide by properly drafted acceptable use policies. In addition, more supervi-
sion by parents, teachers, and librarians would aid in ensuring that children
are not viewing improper material on the Internet. Even that becomes some-
what of a burden on a teacher or librarian who deals with many children daily.
One day this may all be resolved if technology advances to cure the defects
that currently exist in the filtering software programs. Until then the debate
will continue about how best to protect our children without violating the
First Amendment.
On March 20, 2001, the ACLU and the ALA filed a lawsuit in federal
court in Philadelphia contesting the constitutionality of the new filter law. At
present, only the part of the law that mandates filters in libraries is chal-
lenged, not the part that mandates Internet filters on school computers.
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